

# Logoi Pistoi

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## Introduction

We are pleased to announce the second issue of the Australian College of Christian Studies e-Journal, *Logoi Pistoï* (faithful words) and it is freely available to download.

Our *Logoi Pistoï* e-Journal brings together research papers carried out by College faculty and students. This Journal provides an outlet for the sharing of good practice and the development of scholarship.

## Table of Contents

<b>The Reality of Life</b> <b>Dr Xavier Lakshmanan</b>	<b>Page 5</b>
<b>The unity of truth and the unity of Person in the integration model.</b> <b>Dr Peter Yu</b>	<b>Page 14</b>
<b>The history of the Neo-Babylonian Empire with special reference to its interaction with the kingdoms of Israel and Judah.</b> <b>Anthony Kottaridis</b>	<b>Page 22</b>
<b>Book Review: Augustine and the Jews: A Christian Defense of Jews and Judaism. Paula Fredricksen.</b> <b>Dr Paul Thambar</b>	<b>Page 29</b>
<b>Book Review: <i>Cur Deus Homo</i> by Anselm</b> <b>Alex Worley</b>	<b>Page 34</b>

# The Reality of Life

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**By Dr Xavier Lakshmanan**

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Human life is real. It is unique. It is existential. Time, space and mass constitute this life and its existence. Language is the essence of it. This means that human life is temporal and it has a beginning and an end. It was Martin Heidegger who famously exclaimed that existence has a mortal wound: death is a terminal disease of humanity.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, the biblical vision of life intensifies the nature of existence from existence to eternity. It makes the reality of death a passage: from existential life to eternal life through death. This expands existence eternally and eternity existentially, making the reality of life limitless and endless.

This paper addresses such biblical vision of life through the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur is a contemporary philosopher of hope whose notion of existence can inform Christian theological discourse to express a theological vision of existence meaningfully. Ricoeur believes that a sacred text shows a real life; thus a possibility to live. This life is an existential world made intelligible through language. The language of life is metaphor and the reality of life is linguistic. Thus, his concept of language forms the basis for understanding his notion of existence and temporality.<sup>2</sup> In the same way theological discourse understands God's reality is made known to us through revelation but the revelation of God is made possible by language.

According to Ricoeur, the life that the text unfolds is able to redescribe and reorganise one's actual life time and again. It also gives the self self-knowledge by showing self-possibility, which constitute self-identity. Hope comprised of passion, imagination and time makes this redescription of life possible. Passion gives rise to temporality; creative imagination energises it; and the temporal features of time restructure and reorient it in the world.<sup>3</sup> Existence is seen as the form of this redescribed temporality, in which a being is a constant possibility; existence is a radical conflict; and mortality is a way to temporal-eternal circularity. Self-knowledge is grasped as the totality of reoriented temporality as the presence of the possible retrospectively, prospectively and introspectively. The eternal-temporal circularity is established by arguing that temporality possesses eternity and eternity possesses temporality. Thus the totality of human temporality is temporal-eternal and eternal-temporal, which ultimately constitutes self-understanding and self-identity. In this way, human life is always discovered afresh and such a life is a life of self-knowledge and identity.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Martin Heidegger, John Macquarrie (tran.), *Being and Time* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), 349-450.

<sup>2</sup> Xavier Lakshmanan, *Textual Linguistic Theology in Paul Ricoeur* (New York: Peter Lang, 2016), 1-141.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

The sense of the impossibility of attaining a total understanding of existence here and now dissatisfies the theologian Paul Tillich. For him, God alone is the ultimate Being: the “Ground Being.” Tillich characterises existence as an absence of wholeness - “standing out of non-being.”<sup>5</sup> Existence is existentially split for it is not identical with the being in totality. God alone, “Being itself” is God because nothing else is in the same way as God is.<sup>6</sup> Thus, existence is relatively dualistic in its being because God is in a state of totality and human is neither total nor perfect. So the human existence becomes authentically complete only by participating in the wholeness of the total being, the “ground of being.”

This is where Ricoeur insists that human being and temporality must enter into the divine being and eternity, and divine being and eternity must break into human being and temporality by overcoming the mortal limit of mortality. Ricoeur argues that the “theme of distension and intention acquires ... the mediation on eternity and time as intensification”<sup>7</sup> of the mind. He affirms a temporal-eternal and eternal-temporal circularity, which is dynamic and functional: eternity may freely flow into temporality and temporality may enter eternity without obstruction. This will make life endless.

### 1. The Eternalness of Temporality

Ricoeur affirms that temporality contains eternity and it refers beyond itself to eternity. The argument that time “no longer refers to eternity” shows the “ontological deficiency characteristic of human time,”<sup>8</sup> which fundamentally is “afflicting the conception of time as such.”<sup>9</sup> But “temporality possessing eternity deepens time and temporality.”<sup>10</sup> This makes temporality much more than temporal. Rather, it becomes temporally eternal. As a result, human temporality is no longer temporal alone but temporally eternal and eternally temporal.

It was Moltmann who argued that the human soul itself is an indication of eternalness in temporality. Christian hope leads humans to God’s Kingdom that comes from God to be on earth. Both the Kingdom and the human soul are the “angels who belong to heaven”<sup>11</sup> but reside on earth. Humans have come from and belong to earth and “do so in both time and eternity.”<sup>12</sup> As heaven is open for temporal beings, so also the

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<sup>5</sup> Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology* Vol.2 (London: James Nisbet & Co. LTD, 1957), 23.

<sup>6</sup> Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. 2, 23.

<sup>7</sup> Paul Ricoeur, Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (trans.), *Time and Narrative*, Vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 30. This notion of mind receiving intensification as it stretches backward and forward in the process of mediating past time and future time to the present time as presence will be addressed in detail in the later part of this article.

<sup>8</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, Vol. 1, 5.

<sup>9</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, Vol. 1, 5.

<sup>10</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, Vol. 1, 30.

<sup>11</sup> Jürgen Moltmann, Margaret Kohl (tran.), *In the End – The Beginning* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2004), 160.

<sup>12</sup> Moltmann, *In the End – The Beginning*, 160.

temporal is open for the eternal. Thus the Kingdom “lives with the earth, and it is only on earth that human beings can seek the Kingdom of God.”<sup>13</sup> In short, eternity is contained by temporality. This is what Ecclesiastes 3:11 says, “God has set eternity in the human heart.”

The prime example for this is the person of Jesus Christ: God in the form of a human being. As a divine being, he is God who inhabits eternity. He not only broke into humanity, which is part of temporality, but also accommodated himself to be contained by it, comprised by a human soul and a corporeal body. He continues in the same way forever. Thus the temporal body-and-soul of Jesus contained the eternal *Logos* as the divine-human union of Jesus existed in temporality. This can be well understood in Barthian analysis of time: eternity enters temporality in incarnation. And it might be added that there is nothing under temporal conditions in which there is no eternity dwelling. Human existence is both eternally-temporal and temporally-eternal. So Moltmann exclaimed: “Then in all created beings, the fullness of the Deity dwells bodily.”<sup>14</sup> Thus, eternity breaking in and residing in temporality makes temporality more than what it is into what it could be as Ricoeur claims that “temporality possessing eternity deepens temporality and time.”<sup>15</sup>

## 2. Temporalness of Eternity

Ricoeur also affirms that eternity possesses temporality. He shows this by providing an “intensification of the experience of time.”<sup>16</sup> He argues that “time is in the soul” and the soul is everlasting. Therefore, time exists in eternity. Accordingly, “eternity possessing temporality deepens its status of being eternal.”<sup>17</sup> Analysing the creation narratives, he argues that it was not in the universe that God created the universe for until the world was made there was no place called “universe.” This is the sum of *creatio ex nihilo*. Here the “original nothingness,” which is eternal, does not exclude God’s being but “strikes time with an ontological deficiency” because creation begins and ends.<sup>18</sup> The God who is eternal begins and ends his act of creation. How could a God whose being is eternal, where no beginning and no ending is possible, have ever begun to create if temporality had not been present in him? God’s capability of beginning and ending, which are constituents of temporality, indicates that temporality was intrinsic in God. This also explains how God could have had the temporal potential for temporal things that He created. As Ricoeur argues: “how can a temporal creature be made in and through the eternal word?”<sup>19</sup> This is impossible if

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<sup>13</sup> Moltmann, *In the End – The Beginning*, 160.

<sup>14</sup> Moltmann, *In the End – The Beginning*, 160.

<sup>15</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, Vol. 1, 30.

<sup>16</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* Vol. 1, 5.

<sup>17</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* Vol. 1, 30.

<sup>18</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* Vol. 1, 24.

<sup>19</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* Vol. 1, 24.

the potential of temporality was not in the eternal Word. Hence, for Ricoeur, “Eternity, in this sense, is no less a source of enigmas than is time.”<sup>20</sup>

Again, Ricoeur’s view here is close to Moltmann’s theological account of the possibility of temporality in eternity. Moltmann affirms the future of eternity. By holding the time of this world as chronological time and the time of the other world as “aeonic time,”<sup>21</sup> he argues that in the structure of the aeonic time, one can see the “cycles of time” - a “reflection of eternity.”<sup>22</sup> This is a “circle” that has no beginning and end. This is a picture of “reversible time” that does not differentiate between past and future but “moves in a circular course.”<sup>23</sup> In this way, eternal life means one continuously participating in the eternity of God,<sup>24</sup> which brings to human corporeal life “eternal livingness.” Thus one can speak about a life that lasts forever, endless worlds, timeless time, a beginning without ending and a limitless possibility.<sup>25</sup>

Similarly, it can also be argued that the earthly and temporal human life, which is going to be raised to eternal life, also affirms the possibility of eternity accommodating temporality. Christ’s temporal being was transformed into eternal when he ascended to glory in the same manner he was transformed from eternal to temporal. This can be well understood in the Augustinian analysis of time: temporality enters into eternity. Here eternity is temporal and temporality is eternal in a circular way. At the same time, eternity and temporality remain radically different: temporality is qualitatively eternal and quantitatively temporal, governed by a temporal pattern of time. Eternity is qualitatively temporal and quantitatively eternal, ruled by God’s eternal time. As a result, human temporality is eternally temporal and temporally eternal. Here the circularity is dynamic and functional: eternity comes to temporality and temporality goes to eternity. The human possibility that gives rise to self-understanding is temporal-eternal and eternal-temporal. But, at this point, human self-understanding as the totality of life is not intelligible as a present reality because the temporal nature of time – time as past and future – is not yet eradicated.

### 3. Temporal-Eternal Totality of Life

Maintaining temporality as eternal and eternity as temporal, Ricoeur affirms that self-understanding as a temporal-eternal totality, available here and now. As a contrast, Wolfhart Pannenberg affirms an eschatological understanding of totality by emphasising the primacy of the future. The totality is achieved at the end of all temporal processes and historical consummations. The true nature of human being

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<sup>20</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* Vol. 1, 24.

<sup>21</sup> Moltmann, *In the End – The Beginning*, 159.

<sup>22</sup> Moltmann, *In the End – The Beginning*, 159.

<sup>23</sup> Moltmann, *In the End – The Beginning*, 159.

<sup>24</sup> Moltmann, *In the End – The Beginning*, 160.

<sup>25</sup> Moltmann, *In the End – The Beginning*, 160.



and existence is disclosed and understood at the end.<sup>26</sup> Here totality as the human self-understanding and self-identity is possible only at the end of everything that exists – just as, for Heidegger the totality is possible only from the vantage point of death.<sup>27</sup>

Pannenberg's notion is eschatological because he argues that the "totality of existence is possible only from the standpoint of its future."<sup>28</sup> The "future and possible wholeness belong together"<sup>29</sup> and the future of objects determines their true nature. Here, the future dimension of time has primacy over the past and the present. The past and the present make sense only because of the future. In this way, Pannenberg argues that the "present and the past can then be interpreted as participating in the future totality."<sup>30</sup> Accordingly, human self-understanding is "not yet completely present in the process of time."<sup>31</sup> Rather, "everything that exists is what it is only as the anticipation of its future" and "it is what it is always in anticipation of its end and from its end."<sup>32</sup> As a result, "the totality of our lives is hidden from us ... because our future is still ahead of us."<sup>33</sup> Here the totality, which is supposed to be a basis for a meaningful existence, lies

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<sup>26</sup> Wolfhart Pannenberg, Philip Clayton (tran.), *Metaphysics and the Idea of God* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990).

<sup>27</sup> It is in the second part of *Being and Time*, Heidegger addresses this issue of one's grasping of oneself as the unity of human being in terms of its "being-a-whole," which ultimately becomes the basis for Ricoeur to explore it into directions that are far more beyond Heidegger. Heidegger affirms that one gains the understanding of one's own most authentic possibilities as the individual grasps the totality of *Dasein's* existence. Here the existential interpretation of death provides a unifying notion of existence. He argues that death as a reality that stands before a human being is the ultimate and certain possibility of a being. It is the "possibility of no-longer being-able-to-be-there." One must appropriate this ultimate possibility of being as her own highest possibility. This signifies that *Dasein* must constantly anticipate mortality and recognize the intrinsic limit of mortality upon existence, which is an understanding of the "possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all." Accordingly, one's understanding of her own existence from its most authentic point is important for Heidegger for the notion of the wholeness of being emerges from this ultimate human possibility of mortality as the possibility of the impossibility of being. This implies that one can grasp her own existence in its totality only from the stand point of its end. In this way, mortality is an inevitable possibility of being and this is a possibility that one cannot share with others. Thus, Heidegger's understanding of authentic existence, which provides a person with self-understanding and identity, must be grasped as a totality of being by seriously considering the beginning of a being from the most certain end of being and vice-versa. So totality of existence stands marked by one's own birth and death. This expresses that Heidegger's notion of authentic existence of human being must be characterised by a sense of anticipation, which is "Being-toward-death" and a sense of "resoluteness." Here the totality of existence, which is the self-understanding and identity of oneself, emerges out of the "anticipatory resoluteness," in which resoluteness "projects itself not upon random possibilities" but upon the "utmost possibility" of being, which is the finality of human existence. This sense of the importance of the totality of human existence as a way of understanding existence itself leads Heidegger to reinterpret the notion of human being as existence in terms of temporality in the later part of the *Being and Time*. He argues that *Dasein* can be "ahead of itself" because of its "ontological future;" it can "already be in the world" because of its "ontological past;" and it can be "alongside entities" because of its "ontological present." Martin Heidegger, John Macquarrie (tran.), *Being and Time* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978).

<sup>28</sup> Pannenberg, *Metaphysics and the Idea of God*, 78.

<sup>29</sup> Pannenberg, *Metaphysics and the Idea of God*, 86.

<sup>30</sup> Pannenberg, *Metaphysics and the Idea of God*, 87.

<sup>31</sup> Pannenberg, *Metaphysics and the Idea of God*, 104.

<sup>32</sup> Pannenberg, *Metaphysics and the Idea of God*, 88.

<sup>33</sup> Wolfhart Pannenberg, Geoffrey W. Bromiley (tran.), *Systematic Theology* Vol. 3 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 601.

in the unreachable future. The always anticipated future is characterised by the “eternity of God,”<sup>34</sup> in which humans participate by anticipating something beyond mortality. Thus, Pannenberg concludes that the total understanding of human existence is decided by the future of God’s eternity, which is unattainable here and now because everything that exists receives from God “its true and definitive identity” at the end of its existence.<sup>35</sup> This clearly indicates that human self-understanding as a totality cannot be attained in this temporal life. One must wait until the end of everything to truly understand herself and to form a genuine sense of identity. But self-understanding and self-identity are necessary components of meaningful life here and now rather than in the eternal world. It is in exactly this way that theology normally fails to function as a meaningful account of human existence here and now.

However, the advantage of Pannenberg’s proposal is his attempt to connect temporality to God’s eternity by eradicating the limit that mortality places upon human existence as maintained by Heidegger. By doing this, he provides a theological correction to the Heideggerian notion of mortality as the most authentic possibility from which humans must achieve self-understanding and identity. To this extent, Pannenberg and Ricoeur agree. Nevertheless, Pannenberg’s theology of eschatological totality fails in two ways. First, his concept of totality seems to be moving in the same direction of Heidegger in the sense that it is future-oriented and anticipatory. Heidegger maintained that one must be in constant anticipation of mortality. As one exists here and now, one must stand at the end point (mortality) in order to understand oneself from that future point. But it must be noted that Pannenberg simply moved Heidegger’s idea from mortality to God’s eternity: he kept the Heideggerian system intact, but what Heidegger called “death” he called “eternal life.” Second, by making totality an end-event, only attainable after all the temporal processes and consummations of history, Pannenberg’s concept fails to address the issue of human self-understanding and identity as essential constituents of meaningful human existence and being. It is at this juncture that Ricoeur’s notion of the temporal-eternal and eternal-temporal totality proves to be fruitful for theological reflection. For Ricoeur, the totality is not an inaccessible metaphysical postulate of future, but an ontological and linguistic means to self-understanding and identity here and now.

Maintaining eternal-temporal circularity, Ricoeur argues that in eternity, there is no past and future time but only the present, which determines both past and future.<sup>36</sup> Unlike Pannenberg’s future-orientation, Ricoeur emphasises the primacy of the present over the past and the future. By way of analysing Augustine’s view of time, he argues that eternity is “forever still” in contrast to things that are “never still.” This stillness lies in the fact that “in eternity nothing moves into the past: all is present.”<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Pannenberg, *Metaphysics and the Idea of God*, 97.

<sup>35</sup> Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology* Vol. 3, 603.

<sup>36</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* Vol. 1, 30.

<sup>37</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* Vol. 1, 25.

This is what Ricoeur's concept of a "threefold present," in which totality is a result of a convergence, which must be compared "neither with past nor future" but with a temporal-eternal present.<sup>38</sup> He contends that no action takes place in the past, neither in the future, but every action is performed in the present. Hence, the present is the only time of action, and so resembles the nature of eternity here and now.

Ricoeur's phenomenological notion of time basically comes from Augustine's theory of time, which was also later developed by Husserl and Heidegger. He argues that time comprised of past, present and future does not exist because it cannot exist. The past does not exist because it is already gone and it is not happening now. The future does not exist because it has not happened yet and it is not yet here. The present does not exist because it does not last; it is a vanishing point that is always slipping away toward the past or arriving from the future. Most importantly, the present time lacks extension. The moment one expresses the term "now," it has already gone into the past. It is infinitely tiny. Thus the present does not exist in the sense that something is. Hence, for Augustine, time never exists as in the sense of existence but it does exist in a different way, even though neither the past, nor the present, nor the future exists as things are.<sup>39</sup>

Ricoeur offers his idea of the threefold present of time as a psychological-philosophical solution to the Augustinian paradox of time. He argues that time exists in the human mind. The past exists as human memory and history. The future exists as human anticipation and projects. The present exists as human attention and consciousness. Here the past and the future exist in the present; and only if the present exists, then the past and the future exist. This is why Ricoeur mediated temporality to eternity through mortality. Death never stops the possibility of the present that contains in it the past and the future. The mind must constantly stretch in order to comprehend the past and the future within the domain of the present. The mind as it stands here and now constantly stretches itself retrospectively and prospectively. It is at this point that Ricoeur overcomes the Augustinian problem of the present lacking extension. Here memory is the record of what was possible in the past and anticipation is the expectation of what will be possible in the future. The present is the container of them all. As a result, Ricoeur can speak of the present of the past, the present of the future, and the present of the present.<sup>40</sup>

Ricoeur sees this as a "total mediation," a "network of inter-weaving of perspectives" in which the "expectation of the future," "the reception of the past," and "the experience of the present" are merged together into a totality<sup>41</sup> in the present. Here Ricoeur is pulling the past and the future to the present in which the "present reduces to

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<sup>38</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* Vol. 1, 25.

<sup>39</sup> Augustine, Henry Chadwick (tran.), *Confessions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), Book XI.

<sup>40</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, Vol. 1, 60.

<sup>41</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* Vol. 3, 207.

presence.”<sup>42</sup> So the present projects and reflects what was humanly possible and what is going to be humanly possible here and now. Here the present is not a mere time of action that lacks extension but the perpetual locus of the presence of the total: A screen where the picture of what is humanly possible is projected. It is the mirror on which the self sees its possibility. It is this total possibility that unfolds who and what a person totally is. In this way, the present is the presence of the past, of the future and of the present. Here Ricoeur is pushing the past to the future by organising it under the category of “becoming a being affected”<sup>43</sup> and pushing the future to the past by making the present a “time of initiative.”<sup>44</sup> Thus for Ricoeur, the past consists of future, the future consists of the past, and the present consists of both past and future. The present – by becoming no present but the presence of past and future – can have totality of being, not only in the sense of temporal totality but also in terms of the temporal-eternal and eternal-temporal totality. This presence of the totality is directly shown in the individual whose mental process of attention is the recipient and container of it all: the knower and the known of the totality. This means that the totality comes to the human being as the self-knowledge and that self-understanding gives rise to a person’s self-identity as Ricoeur claims: “I attain self-understanding when I grasp the range of my possibilities.”<sup>45</sup> Consequently, Ricoeur argues that the understanding of the present as the presence of the totality “bridges the abyss that opens up between eternal *verbum* and the temporal *vox*.”<sup>46</sup> Thus, crucially, the understanding of totality and the attainment of self-understanding are really a question of understanding the “relations between eternity and time.”<sup>47</sup> Thus totality is a paradox of temporal-eternal and eternal-temporal self-understanding that ultimately shapes human life, temporality and identity.

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<sup>42</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* Vol. 3, 208.

<sup>43</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* Vol. 3, 207.

<sup>44</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* Vol. 3, 208.

<sup>45</sup> Paul Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 37.

<sup>46</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* Vol. 1, 29.

<sup>47</sup> Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative* Vol. 1, 5.

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# The unity of truth and the unity of Person in the integration model

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**By Dr Peter Yu**

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## Introduction

Integration movement of Christianity and psychology is one of the most important issues in counselling nowadays. In an attempt to integrate Christianity and Psychology, several issues arise. Two central issues that are involved in the integration debate are the concept of Unity of Truth and Unity of Persons.

It is essential to understand how the two interact to obtain a wholistic understanding of what integration entails. Nonetheless, it would be appropriate to firstly understand the two concepts, their controversy, and their importance in the counselling process. In this essay, I will focus on the interaction both of the unity of truth and the unity of person in the integration model.

## I. The unity of truth

“All truth is God’s truth”. This proposition is frequently referred to as “the unity of truth”. Christianity affirms that God is the Creator of all things and this established a basic unity of all truth, whether found in scriptural revelation or scientific experimentation (Carter, 1979).

The unity of truth concerns the idea or concept of all truth being God’s truth, including truth discovered outside of Scripture. The concept originated with Calvin (in Kirwan, 1984) who argued that there are several ways in which to derive truth, and even if they are at the hands of nonbelievers, we should still use them.

From this logic, many argue that integration of Psychological truth with Christianity is therefore appropriate, and they see the value that Psychology can supply (Kirwan, 1984; Duvall, Edward, Ciochi, in Moreland & Ciochi, 1993 ; Evan, 1990). Some others (Kilpatrick, 1985, Kirwan, 1984) make it a point to understand the presuppositions that underlie psychology before attempting to place a judgment or make a conclusion concerning its validity. Kirwan (1984) notes that the presuppositions that science make are identical to the presuppositions in Christianity (with the exception of the spiritual aspects), that is: There is a reality that is observable; there is a causality that exists in the universe; physical reality and the human mind’s interpretation of it are logical and rational. Mill (in Moreland & Ciochi, 1993) argues that the fullest approach

to truth requires looking for truth wherever it may be found. Edward (in Moreland & Ciocchi, 1993) goes further to say that truth is 'unified' and 'harmonious', no matter how God choose to uncover it. Kilpatrick (1985) speaks of psychology as a solid and growing body of facts and useful therapies. Russel (in Moreland & Ciocchi, 1993) asserts that according to Lingenfelter's 'deep structure' that is the universal part of man, there needs to be an allowance for complementary insights from different fields with Christianity. This is generally known as the Wholists view (Barker, 2000). In addition, there are several premises in the model of wholists. The first premise is unity of truth in world and Word. The second premise is unity of man. Man was made in the image of God. This means special creation, moral agency, and inherent by God. The third premise is that fallibility of man, his methods and his interpretations. Lastly, neither psychology nor theology is complete sciences (Barker, 2000). Generally, sacred wholists hold to the five premises.

Conversely, there is a growing view of Psychology to include theology, religion or other religious ideas such as sin, evil and guilt as many have realised the deficiency of psychology in dealing with these issues that do reflect reality (Peck, 1988, Kilpatrick, 1985). The question one must ask though, is whether this necessitates that any religion will do as Peck (1988) and Johnson (1945) seems to suggest. Is this type of relativism healthy? One can imagine the hundreds of new streams of psychologies that would arise: Christian psychology, Islamic psychology, Buddhist or Eastern mystical, possibly even a Mormon branch. The real question that one who adopts this viewpoint must ask, is whether there is an absolute spiritual truth. And it seems that science does not have the resources to determine this. Additionally, it is impossible to empirically arrive at an absolute spiritual truth (although some branches of psychology strongly associate itself with Eastern Mystical thought-see Kilpatrick, 1985).

Another view that has been adopted is known as the reductionistic view. This view sees truth in one field but does not assign any validity to the other group. There is an inherent conflict between Christianity and psychology. Secular reductionists deny the spiritual as well as insist on irrelevance of faith. In other words, psychology reductionists insist that theology is unhealthy. Whereas theological reductionists emphasize the superiority of special revelation. Theological reductionists treat psychology as a hostile science.

In this debate it occurs both from the stance of Christianity and from psychology. From the Christian perspective, what Kirwan (1984) calls the 'spiritualised view, it is held that revelation 'supersedes reason'. In addition, the Bible seems to be the only source of truth concerning man and his mind. Ganz (1993) supports this view, and feels that there is no need for psychology. Additionally, he feels that introspection and self-esteem concepts are damaging. The impression that one receives (that Ganz explicitly states) is that the strong response from some toward psychology is derived from the anti-Christian message that psychology began with, and in some ways, continues to

adopt (Kilpatrick, 1985). This concept is interesting as psychology seems to be highly considered as 'value free' as Evans (1990) and Johnson (1945) also assume. However, Kilpatrick (1985) insightfully spots the flaw in that psychology adorns itself in a 'cloak of neutrality' when in fact is quite sided.

On closer analysis, says Kilpatrick (1985), it looks very much like a liberal and progressive movement, and he also uses the example of the ethical code they must adopt: abortion, gay and women's rights (extreme cases).

From the other perspective, Psychology also is very reductionistic in nature. It is too narrow-minded claims Peck (1988), reducing everything to a size where it may be analyzed from a psychological viewpoint or fits into a psychological category, it has a propensity to reduce everything to the physical and natural (Moreland & Ciochi, 1993). The interesting thing to note is that it conveys the message of being open-minded, and value-free when in fact the ideas it may dismiss as irrational indicates some bias. For example, Johnson (1945) mentions that psychology cannot prove or assume the existence of a creator. However, if one assumes the opposite, the non-existence of a creator, it is equally a matter of belief or as it was once put: Atheism is just as much a belief as Theism (Johnson, 1945).

At this point, it would be useful to interject some perspectives on viewing psychology in the reality of what it is. The general message most authors seem to convey is that psychology must be understood in terms of its limitations, it is only then that one can effectively use its findings. Kilpatrick (1985) likens society's reaction to Psychology to the story of the Emperor's new clothes. We (society), argues Kilpatrick (1985), have given Psychology 'emperor status' believing that it knows better than we do in its understanding of man, his values, his family, his motivations; unquestionably. He asserts that it is not about whether we take psychology seriously, but the problem is taking it too seriously, assigning to it the power that it has when there are several 'holes' in its garment (Kilpatrick, 1985). Peck (1988) is in agreement arguing that there is grave danger in cloaking moral judgment in scientific authority. He explains that scientific knowledge is not actually truth, but rather the best approximation of that truth based on scientific opinion. Yet, we esteem scientists on the level of 'philosopher kings'. Kirwan (1984) and Duvall (in Moreland & Ciochi, 1993) share the same concern. They emphasize the importance of distinguishing between the valid findings that psychologists make, and the philosophical conclusions that they sometimes draw. One is valid, the other is not. That is the nature of psychology. It is limited to an understanding of the natural world because it is empirical in nature; it is based on the scientific method (Peck, 1988, Lingenfelter in Moreland & Ciochi, 1993). Psychology cannot speak about metaphysics because it is not qualified to. In many ways it is similar to Christianity because it is a matter of faith in many respects.



One more 'hole' that exists is the view that the only method of verification of a truth is in the scientific method. This is very similar to the Christian reductionist view that believes that there is only one source of truth, which is Scripture.

Nevertheless, there are some who have tried to integrate the two, but have actually ended up revising one, or shaping one field that it might fit into the other, also known as revisionism. Revisionism regard that religion is like any other discipline as well as recognizing that religion has value as myth and symbolism such as hope and sacrifice motifs. Whereas sacred versions of revisionism tend to be dominated by a more liberal, existential theology. In short, the focus of sacred versions is only upon the humanitarian aspects of faith such as love, freedom and responsibility (Barker, 2000).

Peck (1978) is a prime example of this where he shaped Christianity into a form that resembles Eastern mystical thought, and combined it with Psychology and some of his own personal views. On the contrary, what many Christian reductionists are against, are those who claim to be Christian counsellors, when in fact they are merely coating a strand of psychology with Christianity (Ganz, 1993). The problem with this type of integrating is outlined in Kilpatrick (1985), a chapter called "On serving two masters". There he examines many of the revisionistic models or concepts that have arisen especially in the Catholic Church. But as Kilpatrick (1985) notes, often it is an either/or option. This is where the problem lies.

The concept of the unity of truth is essential to counsellors' understanding of what is the best approach for the therapeutic process. If the counsellor can approach it from many different angles, then it is very helpful for the client (Peck, 1988), and helps to give a balanced view of what the root of the problem might be, not reducing the issues at hand. At the same time, the Christian counsellor must ask what his/her role is as a Christian counsellor. Does counselling encourage them to grow ... in the old self? Or to grow in the new self? (See Kilpatrick, 1985).

## II. The unity of persons

For the integrationists, or the wholists, the major integrative issue is the nature of humanity. And consequently, the unity of persons or unity of man. To begin with, let us examine the psychological view of man. Peck (1988) notes that Psychiatry views humans in terms of health and disease, basically what the medical model asserts. And because of the nature of the medical model, it is limited to speaking of natural things, discounting its validity to speak of things concerning metaphysics. However, there has been in the past, some emphasis on the spiritual aspect of man. Some examples are Jung's 'collective unconscious', and several concepts of Humanistic psychology such as 'positive thinking' and 'shedding of responsibility' as mentioned in Kilpatrick (1985). Kilpatrick also notes the growing trend toward a belief in Eastern religions in the Humanistic psychology field.

There is then, a concept of the spiritual aspect of man in psychology, but whether that extends to all branches of psychology is questionable. As Peck (1988) mentions, the focus of psychology has been shifted, ever since Galileo. From then there has been a separation between Psychology and Religion, and thus the natural and the spiritual. Lingenfelter (in Moreland and Ciochi, 1993) discusses this fallacy of Anthropology (which relates to Psychology and other social disciplines too) and that is the ignoring of spiritual aspects of man. It is true, there does seem a lack of focus on the spiritual aspects, but an emphasis on the natural. It does, however, seem contrary to logic to speak of studying the mind of man, and separating the two.

#### The biblical view of human

The truth about human nature found in Scripture focus largely on our relationship with God our need for the salvation he alone can provide. Nevertheless, we can use them as a foundation and framework for a genuinely Christian understanding of persons (Faw, 1995).

The dual nature of humankind is clear in Scripture. According to Genesis 2:7, “The Lord God formed the man from the dust of the ground, and God breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and the man became a living being”. Despite our dual nature, different aspects of which are emphasized by various personality theorists, we are one-a mind – body unity (Faw, 1995). Man works, plays, and relates with others emotionally, spiritually, mentally, and physically. According to Mark 12:30, we are called to worship and “love God with all of our minds, our souls, and our strength-with our entire being”.

From the Christian perspective though, there may be the reductionistic problem of focusing merely on the spiritual aspect, the spiritualised version of counselling (Kirwan, 1984) that associates every psychological problem with sin or some other spiritual aspect.

However, it is clear in both fields that there is an agreement that there are two main parts of a human; their physical aspect and their spiritual aspect. Some would go further to add the emotional and psychological aspects of human existence, but rather what allowance has the counsellor made in his/her therapy, that enables them to deal with all aspects of the person? One concept of the unity of man suggests that he is not simply a collection of parts, but rather that he is one being, a whole entity that is affected in several ways. And when for example, a major event occurs in one’s life, all of them are affected, it is not simply their spiritual or physical nature that is affected. It is not certain that this is the case, but it is a question that one must ask. What parts of a man are affected when he has a mental illness, or struggle? Kirwan (1984), Kilpatrick (1985) and Evans (1990) all assert the importance of dealing with the spiritual aspect also, implying that there is a link, and dealing with the spiritual aspect, will help in the healing process.

Man appears to be multidimensional in nature, there are many parts to man. In the counselling process, it is important to deal with all aspects of the person, as they are all interrelated and function as one being. Man does not function in each part separately, but he is a whole being. These are statements that a wholist would make.

The question then is whether we should use psychological approaches in dealing with the different aspects of man. Lingenfelter (1993) makes a very good point concerning this issue. He argues that Anthropology has ignored the aspect of the spiritual over the years, but has gathered a great deal of understanding on what Scripture might call the 'natural man' in Romans 8. He then analyzed this understanding of man, and found it to be biblically supported, and also tried to understand how the natural man can be transformed through a relationship with Christ. Such is the case with Duvall who discovered that Psychoanalysis is now resembling a Christian view of man, a great deal of Freud's original work having been revised. The emphasis is on relationships, and self-concept rather as opposed to simply drives, and the causes of psychopathology being unmet needs verses id, ego and superego conflict. This also finds support in Scripture that focuses on the importance of relationships between people, and with God. If Psychoanalysis is consistent with Scripture, and helps to heal human relationship can it not be used? Kirwan (1984) also found the same process in the biblical view of some psychological views of man.

In light of this, it seems fair enough for the Christian counsellor to use psychological findings in dealing with the natural man, and to use Scripture in dealing with both, as Scripture speaks of both the natural and the spiritual man. Kirwan's (1984) view does appear to be the most attractive from a Christian perspective, as he uses a great deal of Biblical evidence to support his conclusions concerning what an appropriate therapy would look like.

### III. How to combine "the unity of truth" and "the unity of person"?

The integration movement offers a rapprochement by proposing the adoption of two premises: God is the source of all truth no matter where it is found and God is the source of all truth no matter where it is found and God is the source the source of all truth no matter how it is found (Timpe, 1980). The task of integration involves an explicit relating of truth gleaned from or natural revelation to that derived from special or biblical revelation, of interrelating knowledge gained from the world and knowledge gained from the word (Benner, 1988).

In discussing the prospects for integrating the disciplines of psychology and theology, Collins noted that both these fields are diverse and fragmented. The full development of a Christian perspective on a particular topic requires substantial consensus on what the relevant issues are (Faw, 1998). It is necessary to attempt to clarify the various

components of genuine integration, which make up the communal task of pursuing a better grasp of God's truth.

If we are going to have an effective integration of the revealed truths of Scripture and the findings of psychology, we should continually keep in mind the distinctions between psychological fact and psychological theory and between biblical fact and biblical interpretation. Additionally, psychology need to study the Scripture to deal with the spiritual needs of people. And they need to study the Scripture to avoid heretical teachings.

One of the effective models of integration is a balanced expression of one's intellect and emotions. Our perceptions, thinking, construction of theories, interpretations of Scripture, and style of counselling are all highly influenced by our intellectual and emotional style of living (Carter & Narramore, 1979). Some people favor a cognitive, intellectual style. Some people stress ideas, concepts, facts, and data. What is needed is a balanced perspective that is based on a healthy personal integration of the affective and cognitive sides of life. We need to realize that Christ was both a thinking and feeling person and that we cannot have a truly balanced understanding of human nature unless we are open to both of these avenues of experience in ourselves and others (Carter & Narramore, 1979). The more open we are to all aspects of experience, the more we will be able to gain a complete and accurate understanding of Scriptural truth. The understanding of integration is by intention a restricted one. It is premised on the unity of truth from various sources and therefore values the contribution of both God's written Word and the human disciplines.

### Conclusion

The unity of truth and the unity of persons interact because the question that arises in both areas is the validity of integrating psychology and Christianity. Additionally, they also interact because they are the foundation and they shape the presuppositions or basis of what kind of therapy the counsellor will use. In effect they answer the question of: "what is my source of truth?", and secondly: "what is the nature of man?" and "how does this effect the way I counsel him/her?". A deep consideration of these issues is a very dangerous thing as it questions the very pillars of one's counselling understanding.

Nonetheless, it yields a fruitfulness that will lead to a healthier and better-balanced therapy. In addition, one of the most important things is the guidance of the Holy Spirit to lead us into truth as well as to have an exact understanding of the theology, and the psychology of knowledge to be able to critically evaluate in terms of God's truth.

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# The history of the Neo-Babylonian Empire with special reference to its interaction with the kingdoms of Israel and Judah.

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**By Anthony Kottaridis**

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## Introduction

The glory of *Old* Babylon was that it grew out of mud and was transformed into gold. However, after it was conquered by Assyria it prepared for an even greater transformation. The collective Chaldean mindset refused to forget Babylon's past glory and it was built again: not from mud – but out of its own ashes, and it rapidly attained an historically unforgettable splendour.

This essay will examine the history of the Neo-Babylonian Empire as well as the irony surrounding its foundation, fall, and relationship with the Jews.

## Neo-Babylon Established by a “Nobody”

Were it not for the tenacity of one man, Babylon may never have been reborn. A mysterious figure named Nabopolassar saw the internal deterioration of Assyria, which was swiftly weakening as an empire, and decided to act. As soon as Assyria's king, Ashurbanipal, was dead, he led a rebellion to seize power for himself<sup>48</sup>. Nabopolassar left an inscription where he humbly (or shrewdly) referred to himself as the “son of a Nobody”<sup>49</sup>. He was a Chaldean noble, it seems, but not of royal blood<sup>50</sup>.

The popular Nabopolassar allied himself with the Medes<sup>51</sup> while Assyria, desperate for help, allied itself with its old enemy, Egypt. Nevertheless, Nabopolassar's forces conquered Nineveh in 612 BC, and the Assyrian army standing at Haran, in Syria, were routed in 610<sup>52</sup>.

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<sup>48</sup> Haywood, J. “Historical Atlas of Ancient Civilizations” (2005), pg. 47.

<sup>49</sup> Saggs, H. W. F. “Babylonians” (1995), pg. 163.

<sup>50</sup> Browning, D. “History and Religion of Babylon” (1991), pg. 142.

<sup>51</sup> Saggs, H. W. F. “Babylonians” (1995), pg. 164. Saggs adds, though I don't find it in other sources, that Nabopolassar also allied himself with the Scythians. But seeing that the Medes were always at war with Scythia, I don't see how such an alliance would have worked. If it did Nabopolassar must have been an extremely charismatic diplomat as well as a notable conqueror.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, pg. 142

After Nineveh, the Medes had withdrawn behind the Zagros mountains – leaving the Chaldeans the sole masters of Mesopotamia<sup>53</sup>. The Assyrian Empire was all but finished for good.

In another inscription by Nabopolassar, the following is complacently declared:

*“I slaughtered the land of Assyria, I turned that hostile land into heaps of ruins.”*<sup>54</sup>

Though not related to the great Near Eastern kings – Nabopolassar, it seems, had readily adopted their tyrannical despotism – and put it to good use.

### Enter Nebuchadnezzar

With Assyria fast decaying, Egypt advanced and swallowed up Palestine, Phoenicia and Syria – determining to keep a firm hold on them. The new pharaoh, Necho II, wanted to safeguard Egyptian interests in those lands<sup>55</sup>.

Evidently, trouble was brewing. Egypt’s greed was up against Babylon’s ambition. Nabopolassar, however, was getting old and decided not to campaign personally against Egypt. He remained in Babylon, rebuilding and beautifying it<sup>56</sup>, and sent his son – the young Nebuchadnezzar II, instead<sup>57</sup>.

The Egyptian forces and the remnants of Assyria’s army rallied together at Carchemish to stop Babylon’s new Commander-in-Chief in 605 BC. The battle saw Nebuchadnezzar triumph decisively – if with alarming cruelty and bloodthirstiness<sup>58</sup> – over his enemies, but his advance into Egypt was halted by the news of his father’s death. Nebuchadnezzar returned to Babylon for the crown, having just gained all the territories Egypt had recently absorbed<sup>59</sup>.

### Neo-Babylon meets the Children of Israel

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<sup>53</sup> Brown, D. “Mesopotamia: the Mighty Kings” (2004), pg. 159. This will be very significant in terms of Babylon’s economic destiny.

<sup>54</sup> Haywood, J. “Historical Atlas of Ancient Civilizations” (2005), pg. 48.

<sup>55</sup> Saggs, H. W. F. “Babylonians” (1995), pg. 164.

<sup>56</sup> Hart-Davis, A. (Editor)., “History: the Definitive Visual Guide” (2010), pg. 90. Babylon was, by now, “the centre of the world again.”

<sup>57</sup> Saggs, H. W. F. “Babylonians” (1995), pg. 164.

<sup>58</sup> “Mesopotamia, history of”. (2011). Encyclopædia Britannica. *Encyclopædia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite*. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica.

<sup>59</sup> Browning, D. “History and Religion of Babylon” (1991), pg. 142.

The interaction between Judah and Babylon was destined to be one of violence and sorrow<sup>60</sup>. When Nebuchadnezzar stormed through the Levant and the region of Judah in 604 and 603 BC, Jehoiakim – Judah’s king – became an unwilling vassal of Babylon. Undoubtedly, his pride was severely wounded. When Babylon lost a battle against Egypt in 601 BC, Jehoiakim decided to rebel when the opportunity arose<sup>61</sup>.

Jehoiakim was eventually seduced by Egyptian blandishments and promises of support, which enraged the Babylonians. Egypt was causing enough trouble as it was, let alone a tiny kingdom which should know better than to incite the wrath of world powers<sup>62</sup>.

In the winter of 598 BC, Nebuchadnezzar marched on Jerusalem. Jehoiakim died and his son, Jehoiachin surrendered the city to Babylon three months later<sup>63</sup>. Much of the population was deported to Babylonia<sup>64</sup>. Jehoiachin was taken to Babylon, where texts and archaeological finds have indicated he was well-treated<sup>65</sup>.

Anyone would think this would quieten the Judeans. But their humiliation had only strengthened their resolve to fight back<sup>66</sup>. In 587 BC, after again trusting Egypt for aid, Judah revolted under the sanction of king Zedekiah<sup>67</sup>.

This time the rage of Babylon knew no bounds. Nebuchadnezzar invaded, ravaged Judah and besieged and burned Jerusalem to the ground, temple and all<sup>68 69</sup>. More Judeans were exiled to Babylon<sup>70</sup>.

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<sup>60</sup> The Northern Kingdom of Israel had fallen to Assyria over a century before and been left to whatever may follow conquest, spoil and abandoned hope. In 625 BC the Scythians laid waste to the region – See “Israel”. (2011). *Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite*. What was once Israel was now being populated by Samaritans, but Judah – a more secluded land, less open to trade, was largely protected from the internal social upheavals that plagued the Northern Kingdom. Its primitive pastoral economy rescued it from Assyria, but ‘religious apostasy and practical folly’ would contribute to its fall. See Garber, J. S. “The Concise Encyclopaedia of Ancient Civilizations” (1978), pg. 166.

<sup>61</sup> Browning, D. “History and Religion of Babylon” (1991), pg. 142.

<sup>62</sup> Saggs, H. W. F. “Babylonians” (1995), pg. 165.

<sup>63</sup> Browning, D. “History and Religion of Babylon” (1991), pg. 142.

<sup>64</sup> Haywood, J. “Historical Atlas of Ancient Civilizations” (2005), pg. 48.

<sup>65</sup> Browning, D. “History and Religion of Babylon” (1991), pg. 142.

<sup>66</sup> While the prophet Jeremiah recognised Babylon would be the dominant power for the time being, his warnings, unfortunately, fell on unheeding ears.

<sup>67</sup> Haywood, J. “Historical Atlas of Ancient Civilizations” (2005), pg. 48. Egypt abandoned Judah after a very pathetic attempt to help. They had failed both the Assyrians and the Jews similarly.

<sup>68</sup> Ganeri, A. “World History Encyclopaedia” (2000), pg.44-45.

<sup>69</sup> Reich, B. “A Brief History of Israel” (2005), pg. 36.

<sup>70</sup> Wright, E. H. “Richards Topical Encyclopaedia: Volume 5” (1959), pg. 126-27.



During the Babylonian Captivity, Judah was literally left to rot<sup>71</sup>. Though harsh, Nebuchadnezzar's military policies in the west, including Judah, were methods of consolidating and strengthening his empire. Rebellion and nationalistic uprisings had to be crushed<sup>72</sup>.

### Later History and Assessment

The rebuilt Babylon thrived under Nebuchadnezzar and his successors. It was a glittering city of glazed brick, palaces, gardens, markets, tall houses, courtyards, blue walls decorated with fabulous beasts and over a thousand incense-filled temples<sup>73</sup>.

Culture rose to great heights, and the Neo-Babylonians excelled in art, architecture, mathematics, and astronomy<sup>74</sup>. The Hanging Gardens of Babylon, built by Nebuchadnezzar to please whimsical musings of his Median wife, later became celebrated as one of the so-called seven wonders of the world<sup>75</sup>.

It was an empire of freemen and slaves, priests and laity. The capital held 200,000 people<sup>76</sup>, who had a particular fondness for festivals and beer<sup>77</sup>.

Nebuchadnezzar died in 562 BC<sup>78</sup>. His son, Amel-Marduk, reigned only two years before being killed in a revolution<sup>79</sup>. Nebuchadnezzar's son-in-law, Neriglissar followed<sup>80</sup>. Neriglissar led a campaign to Cilicia to protect Babylonian interests in

<sup>71</sup> Thompson, J.A. "The Bible and Archaeology" (1976), pg. 180. It was neither given upkeep nor continuance of trade – all went to ruin

<sup>72</sup> Garber, J. S. "The Concise Encyclopaedia of Ancient Civilizations" (1978), pg. 202.

<sup>73</sup> Steele, P. "Ancient Iraq" (2007), pg. 54-55.

<sup>74</sup> Ganeri, A. "World History Encyclopaedia" (2000), pg.44-45.

<sup>75</sup> Steele, P. "Ancient Iraq" (2007), pg. 52-53. I personally do not believe the story.

<sup>76</sup> Saggs, "Everyday Life in Babylonia and Assyria" (1967), pg. 164-166. The population was extremely religious – archaic tablets mentioning some 4,000 deities – though each household probably concerned itself with only four or five. Nevertheless, the people, unlike the Jews, were pantheistic – seeing gods all over the place. Even the Euphrates was seen as a god – and it was against the law to spit or urinate in it. One can only imagine the horror of the exiled Jews, who found themselves not only in a strange land – but in a strange *world* – see Garber, J. S. "The Concise Encyclopaedia of Ancient Civilizations" (1978), pg. 204. Additionally, and from a personal longing to digress which was inspired by him: Herodotus, when he travelled to Babylon in 460 BC, was told of the Babylonian belief that their gods actually entered the shrines of their temples to spend the night there, though Herodotus did not believe them. See Herodotus' "The Histories" Book I. Employment-wise, there is evidence of mat-makers, weavers, masons, shoemakers, confectioners, goldsmiths, boatmen, leather-workers, bakers, brewers, blacksmiths, millers, fowlers, carpenters and fishermen, to name a few vocations operating in the cities. Babylon itself was well-organised and divided into named districts. Streets were also given names such as "May the enemy not have victory." See Saggs, "Everyday Life in Babylonia and Assyria" (1967), pg. 164-177.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid, pg. 177. Not much has changed, it seems.

<sup>78</sup> Haywood, J. "Historical Atlas of Ancient Civilizations" (2005), pg. 49.

<sup>79</sup> Saggs, H. W. F. "Babylonians" (1995), pg. 167.

<sup>80</sup> Browning, D. "History and Religion of Babylon" (1991), pg. 143.

557 BC<sup>81</sup>, and was succeeded by his infant son, Labashi-Marduk, who was promptly slain<sup>82</sup>.

It is here (556 BC) the enigmatic Nabonidus ascended to the throne<sup>83</sup>. This last king of Neo-Babylon also, funnily enough, referred to himself as a “Nobody” – just like the Empire’s first leader did<sup>84</sup>.

But as the might of Neo-Babylon was realised with Nabopolassar, the weaknesses of Neo-Babylon became apparent with Nabonidus.

The weakness of Babylon was not military, as is usual in the downfall of civilizations – it was financial. While Nebuchadnezzar’s military conquests brought glory – they permanently damaged the economy<sup>85</sup>. Neo-Babylon, stretching as it did from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, was suffering economically from the fact that the Medes were in control of the rich trade routes from the far east. This was why Nebuchadnezzar had been so anxious to gain control in the south, over Syria and Palestine<sup>86</sup>.

This was also why Nabonidus ventured into Arabia. An incredibly religious man, almost a mystic, Nabonidus insisted his campaign was for the glory of the moon god, Sin, but in actuality, it was an attempt to place Neo-Babylon on a “sounder economic footing”<sup>87</sup>.

Nabonidus left his son Belshazzar in control of Babylon as co-regent while he was away<sup>88</sup>. He was away for ten years.

Still, one could almost smell the end of Babylon. The unsuitability of Nabonidus as a ruler was become increasingly evident, and the Biblical account of Belshazzar is hardly flattering. Nabonidus was too preoccupied with antiquarianism,

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<sup>81</sup> Saggs, H. W. F. “Babylonians” (1995), pg. 167. His land forces were assisted by a fleet. There may have been Medes controlling the region.

<sup>82</sup> “Mesopotamia, history of”. (2011). *Encyclopædia Britannica. Encyclopædia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite*. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica.

<sup>83</sup> Browning, D. “History and Religion of Babylon” (1991), pg. 143.

<sup>84</sup> Brown, D. “Mesopotamia: the Mighty Kings” (2004), pg. 145. He was of non-royal lineage, owing his high status to the entreaties of his mother, Adad-guppi, a courtier and evidently a woman of great spirit and intelligence (and ambition). Still, the Chaldeans being, as I have noted, very religious, accepted his rulership more from his claim to a special relationship with the moon god than from any claim to high status or rank.

<sup>85</sup> Garber, J. S. “The Concise Encyclopaedia of Ancient Civilizations” (1978), pg. 209.

<sup>86</sup> Saggs, “Everyday Life in Babylonia and Assyria” (1967), pg. 52. Add to this his unsuccessful attempt to invade Egypt. Trade routes were a necessity, Media had most of the good ones, and so Babylon needed to find others - fast.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid*, pg. 54.

<sup>88</sup> Haywood, J. “Historical Atlas of Ancient Civilizations” (2005), pg. 49.

archaeology, rebuilding programs and the promotion of the moon god<sup>89</sup>. This made him many enemies, as the priests of Babylon were mainly followers of Marduk<sup>90</sup>.

Add to this the anger caused by the increasing taxes from Nabonidus' building schemes, the dwindling treasury, a drought, the threat of Persia, and the horror of the people at the king's continued absence from the important New Year festivals<sup>91</sup>.

By 539 B.C Cyrus the Great of Persia was becoming too great a threat to ignore<sup>92</sup>. On October 12<sup>th</sup>, while Belshazzar and his friends were, for some reason, having a great feast – the Persians and Medes, under the command of Gobyras entered the city and took it with ease. Cyrus defeated any Babylonian resistance and Neo-Babylon was at an end<sup>93</sup>.

Essentially, Neo-Babylon fell because it failed to keep enough of what gave it glory – money.

It had to struggle like mad to become an empire, only to lose it all without a fight. What it gained by the sword it lost by wine. The Jews had been crushed after an uprising, but would be restored to their land by the uprising of Persia. That much was written on the wall.

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid, pg. 49. I think a valid comparison can be seen in Akhenaton of Egypt, though Nabonidus did not strictly admit to being a monotheist.

<sup>90</sup> “Mesopotamia, history of”. (2011). Encyclopædia Britannica. *Encyclopædia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite*. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica. This was not smart – the priesthood owned virtually half of the land in Babylonia and their influence and power was immense.

<sup>91</sup> Brown, D. “Mesopotamia: the Mighty Kings” (2004), pg. 148.

<sup>92</sup> “Mesopotamia, history of”. (2011). Encyclopædia Britannica. *Encyclopædia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite*. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica.

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Book Review:  
Augustine and the Jews: A Christian  
Defense of Jews and Judaism. Paula  
Fredricksen, Yale University Press,  
October 12, 2010, 503 pages.

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**By Dr Paul Thambar**

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The book, *Augustine and the Jews*, is written by a recognised Augustinian scholar and historian, Dr. Paula Fredrickse. The book deals with the broad subject matter of Augustine's theology of Jews and Judaism and is written in a simple and easy-to-read style. Fredricksen covers a range of issues related to Jews and Judaism including the origins and development of the *Adversus Iudeos* tradition from the early part of the 2<sup>nd</sup> century to Augustine's time. She traces the development of the *Adversus Iudaeos* tradition through a series of key changes: from the shift in the ethnic base of the new religion of Christianity in the late 1<sup>st</sup> century, to the identity forming discourses between Christian intellectuals and both Jews and pagans in the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> centuries which increasingly viewed the intra-Jewish arguments recorded in the Septuagint and the New Testament writings as condemnation of Jews and Judaism, to the final stage of development of the tradition in the 4<sup>th</sup> century when it becomes the measure for orthodoxy of the catholic faith.

The book has a prologue, three sections which each have four chapters and an epilogue. In the prologue, Fredricksen introduces the key research question that she proposes to answer in the rest of the book: *What was the real nature of relationship between Jews, Christians and Pagans?* The basis for the research question is the discrepancies between the *Adversus Iudaeos* tradition, which suggests a hostile relationship, and the non-literary and non-ecclesiastical evidence from inscriptions, documents etc which suggest a more friendly and non-hostile relationship.

Part 1 of the Book, titled the "Legacy of Alexander," sets out the Hellenistic background which is a requirement to understand Augustine's thought in relation to Jews. This part of the book deals with the religious, cultural and historical context of the Mediterranean region which nurtured and developed the Christian faith from Judaism. In Chapter 1, "Gods and their humans" (3-15), Fredricksen describes how gods and humans formed a family unit. This unit formed the core of cults and ethnic groups in the Mediterranean city. She describes how in antiquity, the concept of religious

tolerance and atheism were not issues. Finally she describes the role of civic organization and the cult of the ruler and their impact on society.

Fredricksen begins the discussion in chapter 2, "Gods and the One God," (16-40) by focusing on the concept of monotheism and how it was understood in antiquity. She argues that in antiquity, the existence of other gods were never questioned or denied. She suggests that monotheism in antiquity needs to be understood and analysed in terms of ancient standards and not from a 21<sup>st</sup> century point of view. Describing pagan, Jewish and Christian interactions and relations, particularly, the respect shown to all gods, Fredricksen suggests that the introduction by Christians of the idea that only their God was to be exclusively worshipped created social disruption and a breakdown of the ethnic and religious family unit which was the core of society in antiquity.

Chapter 3, "*Paidea* Pagan, Jewish, Christian" (41-78) includes a detailed discussion of Greek rhetoric and philosophy and how the ideas from these two subjects shaped the social, intellectual and political relations between pagans, Jews and Christians. Fredricksen researches the issues and implications arising from the interaction between monotheistic concepts from the Platonic literature and Greek-speaking Christians and how this interaction helped shape early Christian theology including Christology and canon. She develops a good description of the development of the *Adversus Iudaeos* tradition up to the 4<sup>th</sup> century and shows how the tradition helped to define Jews and Judaism as "carnal" and "fleshly", while the Christian faith was defined as "spiritual" and therefore, superior to Judaism.

Chapter 4, "Pagans, Jews and Christians in the Mediterranean City" (79-102) concludes Part 1 of the book and focuses on the social relations between the three groups. Fredricksen develops the thesis that contrary to the *Adversus Iudaeos* tradition, actual relations between Jews and Christians were more harmonious and friendly. She uses non-literary sources including inscriptions and other archaeological evidence to articulate her view that Jews and Christians enjoyed close ties including supporting each other's religious institutions, festivals and families. Fredricksen argues that the Church fathers used the *Adversus Iudaeos* tradition as a rhetorical construct to define orthodox Christian practices as being more "spiritual" than Judaism and to define their faith in the context of an older and more recognised religion within the Roman Empire. An interesting point she makes in this chapter is on the role of the Mediterranean city as a religious entity in antiquity similar to our local church.

Part 2 of the book, "The Prodigal Son", covers the specific background and context of Augustine's thought and teaching on Jews and Judaism. Chapter 4, "The Heretic," (105-121) includes a discussion, in great detail, of the 3<sup>rd</sup> century heresy, known as Manichaeism. Augustine, as a young man, was attracted to the teaching of this sect, mainly due to their critical approach to the biblical texts and became an auditor. However, through his reading of Neoplatonic literature and the influence of Ambrose,

Catholic bishop of Milan, the older Augustine grew disenchanted with Manichaeism and became a Catholic Christian and Bishop of Hippo. Following this, Augustine engaged in polemics with Manichaeans using the *Adversus Iudaeos* tradition and his new understanding and interpretation of biblical texts, particularly, Genesis and Paul's letters.

Chapter 5, "The Sojourner" (122-154) focuses on the conversion of Augustine to Christianity. Fredricksen describes how the Neoplatonic literature that Augustine had studied and key ideas drawn from this literature in relation to monotheism, free will, flesh, body and spirit led him to convert to Catholic Christianity. She also describes North African Christianity and its various controversies including Donatism and Augustine's very public and successful debate with Faustus, a Manichean Bishop.

Chapter 6, "The Convert" (155-189), deals with a critical period in Augustine's Christian life. Prior to AD396, the young Christian convert struggled with understanding and interpreting the Scriptures, particularly Paul's letters, and questions such as free will and grace. Fredricksen describes this struggle and discusses the role of Tyconius, a Donatist theologian, and his seven rules of scriptural interpretation, which helped Augustine reconceptualise his understanding of the integrity and integration of the Old and New Testaments and the relationship between law and faith. Augustine develops his fourfold scheme of salvation history in AD394 through his work on Romans and applies this scheme historically and biographically. In further developing his thought on law and grace, he develops a complex cycle of divine foreknowledge and human predisposition. Fredricksen uses key writings of Augustine (*Questions, Free Will, Notes on Romans and Simplicianus*) during this period to analyse how Augustine's thought evolved on these issues. Augustine was also involved in a series of controversial discussions with Jerome during this period which helped to sharpen his thought and make him the theological giant of the Church that we have come to know and admire.

In the final chapter of this Part, "The Biblical Theologian" (190-210), Fredricksen focuses on Augustine's theory of language. She details his theory of language and key concepts such as *signa data, propria* and *translate* and describes the implications of these concepts for understanding the biblical texts. She investigates how these concepts influenced Augustine's understanding of how the Jews interpreted their scriptures. She shows how Augustine formed a view that, in contrast to the *Adversus Iudaeos* tradition, the Jews were the only people who knew and kept God's Law prior to the advent of Christ. However, the patriarchs, prophets and other chosen few who are mentioned in the Old Testament had an understanding of the higher purpose of the Law and the work of Christ. For Augustine, historical context was important to understand the biblical texts. Finally, Fredricksen focuses on Augustine's *Confessions*, and deals with key issues including knowledge of God, Augustine's philosophy of time and memory as it relates to language and meaning.

In the final Part, “God and Israel”, Fredricksen focuses on the debate between Augustine and Faustus. This debate forced Augustine to reimagine the relationship between God and Israel and between Judaism and Christianity and led to the development of his famous Witness doctrine. In chapter 9, “The War of Words” (213-234), she describes the context for the famous debate. In his book, *Capitula*, Faustus argues, coherently and critically, that Jewish Law had nothing to do with true Christian revelation of God, Christ and His salvific work for us. Faustus uses Paul and the NT gospels to mount a strong and sustained argument without taking any specific Manichaen doctrinal positions. Faustus refers to Marcion for support while, Augustine calls on Tertullian to support his position. Fredricksen provides more in depth analysis of the *Adversus Iudaeos* tradition particularly in relation to Jewish practices associated with “keeping the Law”.

Fredricksen focuses on her central theme, Augustine’s revised concepts of law and Judaism, in chapter 10, “The Redemption of the Flesh” (235-259). She starts off by describing Augustine’s debate with Jerome over the latter’s interpretation of key events in Galatians, in particular, Paul’s disagreement with Peter. Augustine emphasised the Jewishness of the early Christians including Paul, Peter and other disciples and how they kept the Law even as Christians. He argues that Jesus was a Law abiding Jewish person while on earth. Augustine develops a new understanding of the OT and NT and the law, Jews and Judaism. By keeping the law, Augustine argued that Jesus and the early Christians had given the Law its rightful place in God’s salvation plan as pointing the way forward to Jesus. Through this innovative development of understanding the Law, Augustine was able to blunt Faustus’s critique of Judaism, Jews and the Law and Catholic Christianity’s use of the OT scriptures.

In chapter 11, “The Mark of Cain” (260-289), the focus is on Augustine thought on contemporary Jews and Judaism. Fredricksen describes how Augustine uses the exegesis of the story of Cain to develop his Witness doctrine. Augustine uses Cain as typological construct for the contemporary Jew who is in exile in the diaspora. Augustine develops the “mark of Cain” concept to refer to the Jewish Law and how Jews are able to keep the law and its practices even in exile as God is looking over them. Augustine argues that the “mark of Cain” prevents anyone from killing the Jews for keeping the Law. Fredricksen argues that Augustine developed this idea as a metaphor and that Jews were not facing any actual threats at the time he conceived his Witness doctrine. Augustine argued that the Jews, by keeping the Law and not understanding its spiritual significance, were in fact serving Christians. The Witness doctrine helped Augustine in his debate with Faustus.

The final chapter of Part 3, “Slay Them Not...” (290-352) takes the reader into new terrain and contexts. In this chapter, Fredricksen attempts to describe Augustine’s strategy for dealing with Jews by showing that he focused on the “rhetorical Jew” for the purpose of debate and definition of orthodoxy rather than actual Jews and their social context. Using a range of Augustine’s writings such as his sermons on Psalm



59:12, she shows how Augustine developed his Witness doctrine to support his rhetorical constructs. However, using Augustine's *City of God*, she also shows how Augustine was willing to change his rhetorical constructs to suit his immediate objectives. In the *City of God*, Cain becomes a type for the Christian living in the disappearing Roman world but eagerly awaiting the world from above. For Augustine, "Jews were not a challenge to Christianity but a witness to it" (p351). The book includes an epilogue (353-366) where Fredricksen provides interesting non-literary evidence on the state of actual Jewish-Christian relations during Augustine's lifetime. The evidence points to a more harmonious and friendly relations between the two groups.

Paul Fredricksen has written an engaging book on how a significant patristic Church Father developed his thought on Jews and Judaism and their connection to the Christian faith. She has provided a detailed account of the development of the *Adversus Iudaeos* tradition and how this tradition was used to construct Christian identity and in debates with non-orthodox Christians. Fredricksen describes how Augustine "thought with the Jews" and how this thought helped to influence his theology. The book is not an apologetic presentation of Augustine's thought on the Jews but presents the rhetorical use of the "Jewish construct" to strengthen the Christian faith. Augustine, like many of his predecessors and successors, subordinates Jews in the service of Christians through his Witness doctrine. Fredricksen also presents non-literary evidence that suggests that actual relations between Jews and Christians may have been friendlier than suggested by the rhetorical use of Jews in the service of Christians.

Fredricksen's book raises some interesting questions for further research and debate. How different is Augustine's discourse on Jews and Judaism to other similar Christian discourses in antiquity? How did Augustine's Witness doctrine influence social life in antiquity? What did Augustine actually think and write about on actual Jews? Can Augustine's Witness doctrine and his ideas on Jews and Judaism be used today to develop and improve relations between the two groups? Are there issues in the way theologians such as Augustine used discourses such as the tradition to shape orthodoxy? This book provides a fresh perspective on Augustine and his thought on Jews and Judaism and may help to improve the understanding of contemporary Christians about how their faith was shaped and developed by those who have gone before us. It also helps in an improved understanding and appreciation of Jews and Judaism and their role and connection to the Christian faith.

# Book Review:

## *Cur Deus Homo* Anselm of Canterbury. Pantianos Classics, trans 1903

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**By Alex Worley**

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### Overview of Book

Saint Anselm of Canterbury was born in 1033 and died in 1109. He was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury by William II and was a theologian of saintly character. He was the first to attempt to prove the necessity of the Incarnation and death of the Son of God by the processes of pure reason.<sup>94</sup>

Anselm's "*Cur Deus Homo*" or "Why God Became Man" is a key document in the development of the doctrine of atonement. Anselm was the first to develop the satisfaction theory of atonement and rejected the pardon theory of atonement that was dominant at that time. The pardon theory described a cosmic struggle between God and Satan where Satan was the ruler of this world and thus the ransom of Christ's death was paid to Satan to release mankind back to God. Anselm dismissed this theory and proved by reason that Christ was the perfect satisfaction paid to God for the loss of His honour.<sup>95</sup>

"*Cur Deus Homo*" is actually two books in one. The first book contains twenty five chapters and the second contains twenty three chapters. The first book is written to refute non-believers and the second book is written to believers to strengthen them in their belief.

Anselm develops a detailed, step-by-step, logic based argument for defending the true gospel. This is done in the form of a dialogue between a student and a teacher in the scholastic style. Anselm is also arguing against a prevailing non-Christian argument that the Divine God would never become man, be nurtured by a mother, endure fatigue, feel the lash of a whip and die a humiliating death as an outcast among thieves. Non-Christians at the time thought that this was both completely ridiculous and dishonouring to God.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Philip Schaff, *History of the Christian Church - Complete in 8 volumes (Annotated)* (n.d.), location 56623-56635.

<sup>95</sup> Philip Schaff, *op. cit.*, location 56635; Alister McGrath, *Christian Theology: An Introduction* (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 809; St Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo*, (Acheron Press, n.d.), 1:6-1:7.

<sup>96</sup> Anselm, *op. cit.*, 1:3.

Anselm discusses the two natures of Jesus – His Deity and Humanity in one person. Anselm is not deeply concerned to explain how these two natures can exist within one person but rather argues that it is logical for these two natures to exist within one person for the atonement of humankind to occur. However, he does briefly consider why there must be two separate and full natures rather than one nature consisting of two intermingled parts.<sup>97</sup>

### Analysis

In the first book, Anselm establishes the satisfaction theory of atonement in the Incarnation of the God-man. He establishes that a man ought to make satisfaction for his sin, but that only God is able to make that satisfaction. Therefore, the God-man of Christ is the only logical answer to resolve this dilemma.

In chapters three to five he establishes that it is a beautiful solution to have a man's obedience restore the human race caused by a man's disobedience. This beauty is exemplified in that the devil who had tempted man to eat the fruit of the tree should be vanquished by a man who suffered on a tree. In chapters six and seven he refutes the argument that the devil has a claim over fallen mankind. He argues from the rationale of justice. We cannot be in the power of the devil since we are being persecuted by the devil in accordance with God's justice. We and the devil are fellow thieves and therefore are both under the justice of God. In chapter five he establishes that any creature other than God would make mankind a servant of that creature. Therefore, God Himself must be the one to rescue man from eternal death by making the satisfaction for sin.

Next, he provides an alternative interpretation of several texts to show that the Divine one came willingly. I thought his treatment of Philippians 2:8,9 was superb. He showed that the divine Christ was obedient to death not in the sense that He was commanded to die but rather that He, the Father and the Holy Spirit decided to demonstrate to the world his Divinity in being obedient to the Father's will. This is demonstrated since Jesus was willing to endure death as a result of that obedience.

Having laid the groundwork for the divine and the human working together to resolve the dilemma of man having to but not being able to provide reconciliation, Anselm then reveals his satisfaction card. He defines sin as rebelling against God and robbing Him of His honour and that this honour had to be restored to the extent that it had been robbed plus an additional amount for pain and suffering caused to the injured party. A modern example could be a fifteen year old girl that suffered a cut in her face, leaving a scar from her eye to her chin. There would be the medical bills to repair the cut but there is also an amount to be repaid for the pain and suffering for having a life-long scar on her face.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>97</sup> Anselm, *op. cit.*, 2:7.

<sup>98</sup> Anselm, *op. cit.*, 1:1.

Anselm then explores whether it is just for God to punish or to simply forgive out of mercy and uses the laws of natural justice to prove that God cannot allow the innocent and the guilty to be treated the same and so He must punish the guilty otherwise injustice would not be subject to the law making injustice equal with God, which is illogical. He also justifies punishment because it shows the disobedient person that God is worthy of acknowledgement as Lord.

He leaves no stone unturned in this quest for proving satisfaction. He examines whether God's honour has been somehow lessened by our sin. In other words, what is meant when Anselm states that we rob God of His honour. He responds that nothing can be added to or taken away from God's honour. What happens is that the sinner disturbs the order and beauty of the universe from their own point of view. The universe is distorted by that person's rebellion, God's world and therefore God Himself is dishonoured as the sinner sees it.<sup>99</sup>

In book two, Anselm makes it clear that only a God-man who willingly offers up Himself can make the proper satisfaction for sin. Anselm explores what it means to be this God-man looking at topics such as the sinlessness of Jesus and how could He suffer weaknesses – even examining the question of when did Jesus understand that He was God. Anselm establishes that Christ being a sinless human did not deserve death. Therefore, his offering went well beyond what was required of him. Thus, it could serve as a genuine satisfaction to God for humanity's sins.

### Commentary

Some have criticised Anselm for not using Scripture to defend his position.<sup>100</sup> However, I found it very useful for Anselm to argue from logic rather than to rely on Scripture to prove his point. In my workplace, there are many people who do not accept the authority of Scripture and therefore to quote Scripture to them is pointless. However, to engage with them in a logical and rational argument based on the universal laws of justice is a way of connecting with them and proving the logical reality of Jesus. These individuals are usually very strong thinkers and argue every little detail. Anselm even considers the possibility of an infinite number of what he calls worlds or we would say an infinite number of galaxies or even an infinite number of universes.<sup>101</sup>

This book has given me a much deeper understanding of the doctrine of atonement in terms of explaining the reasoning behind some of the biblical statements. Some of those deeper understandings are:

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<sup>99</sup> Anselm, *op. cit.*, 1:15.

<sup>100</sup> John Hannah, "Anselm on the Doctrine of Atonement", *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 135(540), (1978): 333-344.

<sup>101</sup> Anselm, *op. cit.*, 1:21.

1. Why was a blood sacrifice required – I used to respond to non-Christians by saying that God required the spilling of blood for sin as recorded in the Old Testament. However, now I can use reason and logic by saying that natural justice requires a satisfaction that is equal to and greater than the magnitude of the injury caused. These are terms that a non-Christian could understand if they did not accept the authority of Scripture;<sup>102</sup>
2. Anselm answers the question - why couldn't God just love us and be so full of mercy that he could just forgive without any punishment of sin at all? Now, I can say that without punishment, God would not differentiate between the guilty and the innocent and this is not becoming of Him as He is the perfect expression of natural justice. Furthermore, if injustice is not punished then it is above the law and therefore equal with God who is also above the law and that is a logical inconsistency. God and injustice are not the same therefore God cannot simply forgive without either satisfaction or punishment;<sup>103</sup>
3. The gravity of our sin – when we rebel against His will we oppose the one who can destroy and create this entire world and everything in it – that is a very large sin which greatly robbed God of His honour for which he demanded either satisfaction or punishment.<sup>104</sup>

One of the reasons that attracted me to the book and why I persisted through its detailed question and answer logic structure is that it grapples with and seeks to provide logical reasons as to why Jesus must have had two natures in one person. I found Anselm's explanation of the reason why it had to be this way was quite illuminating:

1. The beauty of the solution – just as man brought death, a man brought life and just as a man was tempted and brought death by the fruit of a tree, so a man was sacrificed on a tree and this brought life. Also, just as the temptation came from a woman, so too the one who made the life giving sacrifice was born of a woman;
2. A creation of the same kind as Adam and Eve ought to make the satisfaction, but could not because of mankind's fallen state in the same way as a slave disobeyed his master and fell into a ditch and found himself powerless to get out of the ditch;
3. God was the only one who could make the satisfaction because the satisfaction had to be greater than the honour robbed of God, there is nothing greater than God Himself, therefore, logic required that God Himself has to make the satisfaction;

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<sup>102</sup> Anselm, *op. cit.*, 1:11 and 1:12.

<sup>103</sup> Anselm, *op. cit.*, 1:12.

<sup>104</sup> Anselm, *op. cit.*, 1:21.

4. It had to be the Word who was incarnate – this is an ingenious piece of logic that excluded the Father as being Incarnate since there would be two grandsons in the Trinity, entirely logical when you read Anselm’s explanation.<sup>105</sup>

Finally, I very much admired Anselm’s exploration of the two natures of Christ in one person:

1. His sinlessness – Anselm’s answer to the question “was Jesus truly sinless” and his explanation of John 8:55 was exquisite. Jesus’ humanity meant that He was able to lie, but his Divinity meant that He was not willing to lie – He literally had no desire to lie and therefore He was both able to sin and not able to sin at the same time;<sup>106</sup>
2. Immortality – Anselm discusses whether Christ was willing to die and discusses the issue of Jesus’ humanity in the process; it had simply not entered my mind that Jesus would not have died had He not given Himself over to death. I now realise that He would not have died because He was the perfect sinless human – death is not part of the image of God that we were given in the garden. This created a wonderful reassurance that in our resurrected state, we too will be perfect humanity and will not die;<sup>107</sup>
3. His weaknesses – Anselm explored the issue of how much Jesus entered into fallen humanity. He concluded that even though Jesus was the perfect human, He was not miserable and He perfectly understands good from evil.<sup>108</sup>

### Conclusion

Anselm’s detailed reasoning is at times hard to follow. However, he considers many issues that are relevant to evangelism today. Specifically, I found his non-use of Scripture to base his arguments and his explanation of Scriptural texts such as John 8:55 provided strength and logic to the fact that Jesus was the perfect human and yet the perfect divine. In Him, we can trust in the one who truly experienced our weaknesses and yet did not sin even though He was able to do so. In so doing, Anselm laid the foundation for the vicarious substitutionary theory of atonement that was to follow.

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<sup>105</sup> Anselm, *op. cit.*, 2:9.

<sup>106</sup> Anselm, *op. cit.*, 2:10.

<sup>107</sup> Anselm, *op. cit.*, 2:11.

<sup>108</sup> Anselm, *op. cit.*, 2:12.

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